2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

6 June 2005

Original: English

Summary record of the 7th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 5 May 2005, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. de Zueiroz Duarte ..... (Brazil)
later: Mr. Heinsberg (Vice-President) ..... (Germany)

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

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Dolhov** (Ukraine) said that, regrettably, significant gaps in the nuclear non-proliferation regime had in recent years put the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) under stress and brought its credibility into question. The current Conference must chart a course of action to improve the implementation of the NPT, meet present challenges and close the loopholes in regime. There was a need to build on the results of the historic 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Failure to do so would result in the further erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and seriously affect international security and stability. It had been almost 11 years since Ukraine's landmark decision to forswear what had been the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. That decision had been crucial for progress in nuclear disarmament and had been among the factors leading to the successful outcome of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. His Government continued to attach great importance to achieving the universality of and strict compliance with the NPT.

2. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was vital to efforts to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. Ukraine was committed to strict implementation of the resolution and called upon other States to follow suit.

3. His delegation noted with satisfaction the progress made in strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Ukraine had been among the States that had requested the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the summer of 2004 to convene a diplomatic conference to amend the Convention. Slow but steady progress had been made in the universalization of the IAEA additional protocol. An integral part of the safeguards system, the additional protocol was an extremely important tool for sustaining an environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy without the threat of proliferation. The verification role of IAEA must therefore be strengthened. Furthermore, the safeguards system was a prerequisite for the nuclear non-proliferation regime to be effective and credible. His Government was currently completing the domestic legal procedures necessary to bring the additional protocol into force. It actively participated in and strictly abided by all major multilateral export control regimes, which it considered should be further enhanced.

4. Concerning new measures by the international community to prevent nuclear proliferation, Ukraine was seeking ways to expand its involvement in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, launched in 2004, as well as in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which had proved to be very effective. The Group of Eight (G-8) Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction also had much potential for countering negative trends in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. His Government welcomed the progress report by the G-8 members at their Sea Island summit in June 2004 and stood ready to contribute to further development of the Global Partnership based on the experience gained in implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme.

5. His Government called on nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT. Reductions in nuclear arsenals, in particular under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, should be irreversible, and the two nuclear-weapon States concerned should seek to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the presidential nuclear initiatives of 1991 and 1992.

6. The problems in implementing both the non-proliferation and the disarmament clauses of the NPT should be given equal weight. There could be no progress in combating nuclear proliferation without tangible steps towards nuclear disarmament and vice versa.

7. His Government called on all States that had not yet done so to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without delay or conditions, especially the 44 States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force. As regional facilitator of the 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Ukraine would continue to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Conference and urged all States with nuclear capabilities to abide by the international moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. In addition, every effort must be made to surmount the protracted political impasse at the Conference on Disarmament

and to begin negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty.

8. The situation on the Korean peninsula continued to be a cause of concern. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must relinquish its nuclear ambitions, resume cooperation with the IAEA and comply without delay with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the other States concerned must make every effort to resume the six-party talks to resolve the crisis.

9. Legally binding security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by eliminating incentives for pursuing capabilities. The establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had contributed significantly to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and disarmament. Ukraine welcomed the efforts made by the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

10. Enhanced participation by civil society in the work of the NPT was important. His Government supported the working paper submitted by Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden on disarmament and non-proliferation education and called on the Conference to encourage States to implement the relevant recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124).

11. The success of the current Review Conference would depend largely on the Parties' ability to agree on substantive measures to meet current pressing challenges. The Conference must above all ensure that the NPT remained one of the main elements of international peace and security and demonstrate the efficiency of the review process.

12. *Mr. Heinsberg (Germany), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

13. **Mr. Neil** (Jamaica) said that the current Conference provided an opportunity to assess the validity and integrity of the NPT. His delegation shared the disappointment expressed by many others at the continuing lack of any real progress in the multilateral disarmament agenda. Since the 2000 Review Conference there had been a sense that the NPT regime was in crisis. The development of new nuclear weapons and improvements in weapons capability among nuclear-weapon States, the possibility of access by non-State actors to nuclear weapons, the withdrawal from the Treaty of one State party and accusations made against certain countries that they were part of a network of instability had contributed to a heightened sense of insecurity. Some States had also begun to place increased emphasis on the nuclear option for the purposes of self-defence, which jeopardized the delicate balance between disarmament and non-proliferation objectives envisaged by the NPT.

14. A review of the past five years had nonetheless shown a few positive developments: further steps towards universality of the NPT had been taken with the accession of Cuba and Timor-Leste; there had been additional signatories to and ratifications of the CTBT; and agreement has been reached among the Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. Jamaica continued to place emphasis on the role that nuclear-weapon-free zones played in enhancing the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. It commended the Government of Mexico for hosting the first conference of States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in April 2005, which should be given due consideration at the present NPT Review Conference.

15. His delegation was concerned that the three pillars of the NPT — disarmament, non-proliferation and guarantees for the peaceful use of nuclear energy — were not being given equal attention. The grand bargain between non-proliferation and disarmament which had helped to establish the NPT must be adhered to in letter and spirit. The continued development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by a few served only to incite others to challenge their supremacy, thereby undermining the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament. The main burden of responsibility for the situation must be borne by the nuclear-weapon States, which had failed to live up to their obligations under article VI. The predominance of non-proliferation concerns at the expense of disarmament must be addressed. Similarly, the Conference should consider ways to strengthen the disarmament regime through implementation of the NPT. Special group arrangements to support non-proliferation should also be subject to universal,

intergovernmental discussion before being integrated as part of the NPT regime.

16. The preservation of article IV obligations continued to be of paramount importance. In a time of diminishing resources and increased costs of energy, the benefits to be gained through the peaceful application of nuclear energy remained of value to the developing world. Such access should not be denied based on a selective and limited interpretation of events. The role of IAEA in providing the necessary monitoring and verification should be strengthened and respected. For its part, Jamaica had fully adhered to the IAEA safeguards system.

17. The NPT provided the best multilateral framework in which to address the security concerns of the international community. States parties should continue to consider ways in which to strengthen the Treaty based on broadening cooperation and promoting understanding and confidence in the NPT.

18. **Mr. Chowdhury** (Bangladesh) said that his country, which had an impeccable non-proliferation record, was committed to full compliance with the NPT and the CTBT. His Government had unconditionally opted to remain non-nuclear. Its unequivocal commitment to the full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects was based on its constitutional obligation to general and complete disarmament. Bangladesh had also concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including an additional protocol, and was a party to all disarmament-related treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention on Conventional Weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention.

19. His delegation called on all States to implement the 13 steps outlined in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and was concerned at the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States in that regard. His Government regretted the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, whose working methods required a serious review, and urged States to start negotiations in good faith to conclude a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

20. Bangladesh welcomed the reduction of nuclear arsenals through arrangements outside the NPT. Such arrangements, however, should complement rather than substitute for the NPT. It was also concerned at the continued development of new, more sophisticated and precise types of nuclear weapons, which increased the likelihood that such weapons would be used. Furthermore, it regretted that the CTBT had not entered into force.

21. Any new measures proposed at the current Conference must avoid limiting the rights of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Treaty.

22. His Government supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all parts of the world, including the Middle East and South Asia and commended the five Central Asian States for establishing such a zone in their region. It also welcomed the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. Bangladesh regretted the frustration of efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East and called on Israel to accede to the NPT immediately and to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards.

23. Bangladesh attached particular importance to the universalization of the NPT. It was encouraged by the decision by India and Pakistan to impose a moratorium on further nuclear testing. Nevertheless, it called on both States to accede to the NPT and submit their nuclear facilities to IAEA surveillance. His Government also welcomed the decision by Cuba and Timor-Leste to join the NPT.

24. Negative security assurances were vital to strengthening the NPT, as they discouraged non-nuclear States to opt for nuclear weapons. His Government therefore called on nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm their commitment to providing negative security assurances, which would greatly promote non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

25. The IAEA safeguards and verification systems, together with technical assistance programmes particularly in the area of health, agriculture, environment and industry, should be strengthened. States parties must ensure that the Agency had the necessary resources to accomplish those tasks. His Government recognized the important role of the civil society organizations in raising awareness and in creating momentum on such vitally important issues and encouraged their continued participation in activities towards achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. It supported the Mayors-for-Peace movement and their vision to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free world by 2020.

26. Because security lay not in making weapons but in making peace through establishing linkages between peoples, Bangladesh had been submitted a resolution every year on the establishment of a culture of peace and recommended that it should be reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General on United Nations reform and that a mechanism in the Secretariat should be established for that purpose.

27. **Mr. Menon** (Singapore) said that the NPT, with its system of integrated safeguards, remained the lynchpin of the global non-proliferation regime and one of the best guarantees for the security of small States like Singapore. It was the only global treaty dedicated to the containment and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

28. The Review Conference must build on the progress made five years earlier and ensure that the NPT remained the best defence against the spread of nuclear weapons. It must also muster the necessary political will to make progress on the 13 practical steps to disarmament and non-proliferation agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, the CTBT and the fissile material cut-off treaty.

29. Compliance with various non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaties, above all the NPT, remained a key priority for Singapore. The IAEA safeguards system should be strengthened and the additional protocol should be adopted as the new non-proliferation standard. States parties that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA should do so without delay. His Government hoped to conclude an additional protocol at the earliest opportunity.

30. His delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rejoin the NPT and abide by its non-proliferation obligations, including full cooperation with the IAEA. The Conference must also explore ways of strengthening the NPT regime's ability to deal with similar cases in the future.

31. Singapore welcomed the commitment by the United States of America and Russia, under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 and encouraged them to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament. Singapore had consistently contributed its full assessed share of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund to help to share and spread the benefits of nuclear knowledge. Under the Singapore-IAEA memorandum of understanding on Technical Cooperation, it had also conducted a host of third-country training programmes and other activities in areas such as radiation protection and nuclear medicine.

32. While Singapore supported efforts to help countries reap the benefits of harnessing the peaceful use of nuclear technology it was vital to ensure that non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in relation to peaceful nuclear technology transfer and technical cooperation activities were carried out in strict compliance with international standards on nuclear safety and security.

33. The discovery of a sophisticated and clandestine nuclear procurement network supplying nuclear material, equipment and technology was deeply worrying. It was imperative for States to exercise individual and collective efforts to counter such threats and continue to find ways to enhance international cooperation. Singapore therefore supported full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). While multilateralism should form the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and promote global security, other initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative were important for bolstering ongoing international counter-proliferation efforts. The work of the Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle also contributed to those efforts.

34. Equal weight must be given to all aspects of commitments undertaken by States parties under the NPT. Singapore therefore called for full and non-selective implementation of all three pillars of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT was a key instrument in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote nuclear disarmament and required strengthening to meet the new proliferation challenges.

35. **Mr. Le Luong Minh** (Viet Nam) said that the continued absence of equal treatment of the vertical and horizontal aspects of non-proliferation would only delay the time when the world was free from nuclear weapons. While the non-proliferation regime had been strictly observed by the overwhelming majority of the more than 180 non-nuclear-weapon States, disarmament had not received the same level of emphasis by the nuclear-weapon States. Although those States had undertaken to comply fully with

article VI of the Treaty at the 2000 Review Conference, thousands of nuclear weapons still existed, many on alert status, and negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had yet to resume. Alarming new security doctrines gave an even broader role to nuclear weapons, jeopardizing the authority and relevance of the Treaty.

36. Regrettably, conditions were being attached to the security assurances given by nuclear-weapon States to those States which had voluntarily opted not to acquire nuclear weapons. Early conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be given attention at the Review Conference.

37. The recent conference of members of nuclear-weapon-free zones had reaffirmed the conviction that such zones were an important disarmament measure. It was encouraging to note that over 100 States had signed treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Efforts must continue to implement the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review Conference on establishing such a zone in the Middle East. One of the most important factors determining the effectiveness of the treaties establishing such zones was the signing of their protocols by the nuclear-weapon States. His Government welcomed China's readiness to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok).

38. The peaceful use of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the Treaty, was as important as non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. His delegation shared the concerns over the tendency to apply undue restrictions on exports of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries. While supporting and commending the work of IAEA to ensure compliance, his delegation believed there could be a better balance between its resources for safeguards and those for technical assistance.

39. The Treaty had played a vital role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but its future was at stake. The international community must decide whether to move forward by restoring its relevance or simply to allow the confidence of States in the Treaty to continue to erode.

40. **Mr. Aranibar** Quiroga (Bolivia) said that the Treaty must be strengthened and revitalized by the Review Conference, not only because of changes in nuclear policy by some Powers, the persistent refusal of some States to ratify it and the withdrawal by one State, but also because of the increasing danger that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of non-State actors, in particular terrorist groups. Vertical and horizontal proliferation posed a threat to the survival of all States, big and small, rich and poor, whether or not they had nuclear weapons. Yet the international community had not sufficiently recognized that danger, even though the devastating effects of a nuclear catastrophe were well known.

41. The Treaty was the best instrument available for establishing global monitoring over technological processes with a view to ensuring that nuclear energy was not used in an uncontrolled manner. Yet its potential could not be tapped to the full without the willingness of all States with nuclear technology to promote the broadest possible exchange of scientific research, information and equipment for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

42. The Treaty should be improved and, despite the challenges it was currently facing, should remain the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The Review Conference provided an opportunity for all Parties to reaffirm their political will to continue and consolidate the progress made in 1995, and in particular the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000. Bolivia shared the growing concern at the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which had not been able to reach consensus on a substantive agenda for several years. It welcomed the Declaration of the conference on nuclear-weapon-free zones just held in Mexico and would continue to support all initiatives to establish such zones in every region of the world. With the cooperation of IAEA, it had established the Bolivian Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology.

43. The system of collective security for the twenty-first century required the universality of the Treaty and the early entry into force of the CTBT, as tangible signs of effective multilateralism.

44. **Mr. Castellón Duarte** (Nicaragua) said that the universality of the Treaty was of the utmost importance for the future of the international community; it therefore urged those States which had not done so to accede to the Treaty, and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to rejoin it as a full member.

Nuclear-weapon States must reduce their stockpiles in an effort to discourage proliferation and to move towards the total destruction of all nuclear weapons, the only absolute guarantee of safety. In that regard the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2002 was a major step forward.

45. As a non-nuclear weapon State, Nicaragua called on the nuclear-weapon States to provide adequate guarantees, including the negotiation of a binding agreement against the threat or use of such weapons against States without them. His delegation was also concerned that the CTBT had not yet entered into force, and it called on the States mentioned in its annex II to sign and ratify it without further delay.

46. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) had made a major contribution to the cause of non-proliferation by emphasizing the need to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to weapons technology, nuclear materials and biological and chemical agents. The recent adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also a positive step, and Nicaragua hoped for its early entry into force.

47. In conclusion, his delegation was convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons represented a threat to the survival of humanity and that the only true guarantee against their use or the threat of use was their total elimination.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

NPT/CONF.2005/SR.8

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

14 June 2005

Original: English

Summary record of the 8th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 5 May 2005, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. de Queiroz Duarte ..... (Brazil)

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

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Freeman** (United Kingdom) said that the new global threats since 2000 and the challenges to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had served only to underline its importance and strengthen his Government's support for it. The NPT had been an international success story. The United Kingdom continued to implement the decisions of past review conferences and abide by its undertakings on non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament.

2. Recent challenges to the non-proliferation regime by a few signatory States should not prevent the great majority of States parties from enjoying the benefits to be gained from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under article IV of the Treaty. Those which had taken advantage of that provision to develop clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes had challenged the rest to work together to contain their activities and prevent future abuses of the Treaty. The United Kingdom called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to stop developing nuclear weapons, declare all its past nuclear activity, and verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its entire nuclear programme, while returning to negotiations. The proliferation implications of the nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran were also disquieting. However, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and representatives of the European Union were working with it to develop long-term arrangements to rebuild international confidence in its intentions and to persuade it to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activity and to reconsider its decision to construct a heavy-water reactor.

3. The possibility that terrorist groups could obtain and use weapons of mass destruction was a further worrying development. Every effort must be made to dismantle any remaining elements of the clandestine international supply and procurement network that had come to light in late 2003, and to shut down other illegal nuclear suppliers and networks.

4. The work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) underpinned the Treaty. The Agency stood in the front line against those who would evade or deny their international obligations. The United Kingdom called on all non-nuclear-weapon States to conclude IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols to them, both of which should become a future condition for supply of sensitive nuclear materials. The 2005 report of the IAEA Expert Group on Multilateral Nuclear Approaches had shown that effective ways must be found to control the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies without compromising the benefits of legitimate civil use.

5. All Governments should employ a broad range of approaches to counter proliferation and complement the provisions of the Treaty and the excellent work of the IAEA. Strong, comprehensive export controls were necessary. State interdiction, under the Proliferation Security Initiative, of illicit transport of nuclear supplies and technologies also had a role to play. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the recently adopted International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism offered further tools. The forthcoming amendment and strengthening of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in would also help prevent the acquisition of sensitive materials by terrorists.

6. The United Kingdom welcomed the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565) and the Secretary-General's response to it in his "In larger freedom" report (A/59/2005), in which he made recommendations for the current Review Conference that should be carefully scrutinized.

7. Recent positive developments that deserved mention included the decision of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to dismantle its illegal weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. The United Kingdom called on others engaged in such programmes in clear contravention of their treaty obligations to follow that country's example.

8. As a nuclear-weapon State, the United Kingdom recognized its particular obligations and reaffirmed its unequivocal undertaking to eventually eliminate its nuclear arsenals. British nuclear weapons were for deterrence only and had a political, not a military, role. All reductions in nuclear-weapon levels, whether achieved unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, hastened the final goal of global disarmament. The United Kingdom had, since the end of the cold war, reduced the explosive power of its nuclear forces by more than 70 per cent, and had completely dismantled its Chevaline warheads since 2000. It reiterated its

intention to abide by the moratorium on nuclear testing. It looked forward to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to the early negotiation, without preconditions, of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

9. Standing by all the security assurances it had given to non-nuclear-weapon States in the past, the United Kingdom, as evidence of its support for nuclear-weapon-free zones, had ratified or would ratify the protocols to the relevant treaties establishing such zones. It would continue to work nationally, bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

10. **Mr. Kaludjerović** (Serbia and Montenegro) observed that the successful outcome of the Review Conference would buttress the entire network of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, of which the NPT, with its prevention and verification systems, was the cornerstone.

11. The Conference could not afford to set modest goals but rather had to achieve the broadest possible cooperation to ensure full compliance by all States parties, which shared responsibilities as well as benefits. The ultimate benefit of the Treaty, which both aimed to rid the world of nuclear weapons and fostered the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, would be a more secure and more developed world. The Treaty must achieve universality; and its system of controls had to be expanded by making IAEA additional protocols part of the required standard for verification.

12. As a successor State and first-time participant in a Review Conference, Serbia and Montenegro endorsed the Treaty and all previous consensus decisions. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, it sought the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction. It was the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to gradually achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament.

13. His Government attached great importance to the early entry into force of the CTBT, which it had ratified in 2004, and it supported an early start to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty. As part of its fruitful cooperation with IAEA, it was in the process of concluding an additional protocol and was working on the management of radioactive waste. It also welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the adoption by the General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

14. Aware of the need for a strong national export-control regime, his Government had begun to implement legislation on foreign trade in arms, military equipment and dual-use goods. It was also fully committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under a strict verification regime.

15. **Mr. Own** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) recalled that, following the path of international dialogue and cooperation, his country had in December 2003 voluntarily agreed to get rid of all equipment and programmes leading to the production of internationally prohibited weapons. Since then, it had ceased all testing and uranium enrichment and all importing of nuclear materials; it had dismantled its equipment and systems under IAEA supervision and with the assistance of IAEA, the United States and the United Kingdom. His Government had ratified the CTBT, concluded an IAEA additional protocol retroactive to December 2003, and applied for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

16. Already in 1989, his Government had officially condemned weapons of mass destruction, thereby demonstrating that it was a country dedicated to peace and security and to the goals of the NPT. The international community must take vigorous action, applicable to all States without exception, to do away with weapons of mass destruction and foster instead the development of all the world's peoples.

17. The Libyan initiative required a response from the nuclear-weapon States: the necessary assurance to the non-nuclear-weapon States that weapons of mass destruction would not be used against them. Yet tens of thousands of nuclear weapons were still in place, thousands of them in a state of full preparedness. As obligated under article VI of the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States must begin to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The Conference on Disarmament should be urged to start negotiations immediately on a non-discriminatory fissile materials cut-off treaty, and to revive the ad hoc committee on negative security assurances that it had established in 1998.

18. All States, whether parties to the NPT or not, should forswear nuclear aggression and nuclear intimidation. In the Middle East, only Israel was not a party to the NPT, and the nuclear weapons in its possession threatened and terrorized the entire Arab region and made a mockery of the NPT. It was urgent for Israel to ratify the Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; and in the meantime other nuclear-weapon States should, pursuant to article I of the Treaty, refuse to supply Israel with nuclear material or assistance. All States parties should also hasten the formal establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

19. Under article IV of the Treaty, all States were entitled to pursue nuclear research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The nuclear States should help the developing countries to meet their legitimate needs for nuclear energy and a free transfer of technology.

20. The Review Conference should make a number of recommendations. It should highlight the importance of the full observance of articles I and VI of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States should be called upon not to share or export nuclear technology or know-how except for peaceful purposes; to cease to update their own nuclear-weapon systems or produce new weapons; and to begin to eliminate their own nuclear arsenals within a specific time frame. No nuclear missiles should be kept in a state of preparedness, and all such missiles should be withdrawn from foreign military bases. Negotiations should begin on a treaty on dismantling nuclear weapons and eliminating double standards in nuclear policy. The funds currently spent on arsenals should be used instead to improve living standards, health care and education in poor countries and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

21. **Mr. Mahiga** (United Republic of Tanzania), after recalling decisions taken at previous Conferences, said it was regrettable that the 13 practical steps for the implementation of article VI had not been put into effect, as they provided a feasible way of moving forward and were crucial to the future of the NPT. The NPT had faced its greatest challenges in recent years. Nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, upgrading both their weapons and delivery systems, while the threshold for using such weapons had been lowered. Factors such as the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the NPT in 2003 and the illegal transfer of nuclear technology by non-State actors did not bode well for the NPT, while its indefinite extension had not brought about the expected results. Nuclear weapons needed to be eliminated, in an irreversible, transparent and verifiable manner, and the three nuclear-weapon States which had not joined the NPT should do so.

22. His Government was fully committed to the NPT objectives, as demonstrated by its ratification of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, the CTBT and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It had also signed an IAEA Additional Protocol.

23. Nuclear proliferation needed to be curbed decisively, collectively and in a timely manner. He stressed the equal importance of the three pillars of the NPT; attempts to separate those pillars or implement the NPT selectively could have a damaging impact on the Treaty. Regrettably, there had been little progress on nuclear disarmament since 1995. The important role played by nuclear-weapon-free zones in efforts towards nuclear disarmament could not be overemphasized: they strengthened peace and security and built confidence among States. The recent Conference of States parties to treaties establishing such zones had further demonstrated the commitment of those States to a world free from nuclear weapons. He stressed the urgent need for States in the Middle East to establish such a zone and called on Israel to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Reaffirming support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, he hoped that the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia would be established soon.

24. Emphasizing that negative security assurances were considered a temporary measure pending total elimination of nuclear weapons, he again called on nuclear-weapon States to honour their obligation to conclude a legally binding agreement containing such assurances. Simply signing the protocol to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty was inadequate and was not legally binding.

25. IAEA played a key role in enhancing nuclear safety and should be given the necessary human and financial resources to improve its performance. In addition, all States parties should sign an additional protocol, as proposed in 2000. His delegation nonetheless reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Export controls had worked against the interests of developing countries, denying them the science and technology needed for development.

26. A moratorium on nuclear testing provided no guarantee against future testing. It was therefore regrettable that the CTBT, the only true guarantee, had not yet entered into force. He called on States that had not yet done so to ratify it as soon as possible, particularly those whose ratification was required for its entry into force. It was every State party's obligation to ensure that the current Conference had a successful outcome, as its success was a crucial step towards achieving freedom from fear, as outlined in the Secretary-General's report entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005), and reforming the United Nations for enhanced international peace and security.

27. **Mr. Carrera** (Cuba) said that his Government had deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT in 2002, demonstrating its political will and commitment to strengthening multilateralism and international disarmament treaties and contributing to efforts to safeguard the United Nations and preserve global peace and security, even though the world's major nuclear Power maintained a policy of hostility towards Cuba that did not exclude the use of armed force. Cuba had previously had reservations concerning the NPT because it considered it to be a discriminatory mechanism under which States had unequal rights and commitments. It was regrettable that the small percentage of States parties possessing nuclear weapons had not fulfilled their NPT obligations regarding nuclear disarmament or their unequivocal undertaking to total elimination made at the 2000 Conference. As a State party to the NPT, Cuba's position remained unchanged, only now it would work from within the Treaty to attain the total elimination of nuclear weapons. For Cuba, the NPT was only a step towards that goal.

28. Military doctrines based on the possession of nuclear weapons were unsustainable and unacceptable. The new strategic defence doctrines of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including international security concepts based on military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies and the expansion of the right to use, or threaten to use, force in international relations, were very worrying, particularly for poor and non-aligned countries. Indeed, the so-called strategic pre-emptive doctrine contradicted the very spirit of the NPT. The only way to avoid the disastrous consequences of using nuclear weapons was to negotiate a comprehensive and multilateral Convention encompassing disarmament, verification, assistance and cooperation. The Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate framework for such negotiations, which Cuba was ready to start immediately. Although Cuba had only recently joined the NPT, his Government had never had the intention to develop or possess nuclear weapons, nor had it based its defence plans on the possession thereof. Indeed, the principles of the 1959 Revolution were diametrically opposed to anything contributing to their existence. Cuba was interested only in the peaceful use of nuclear energy under IAEA verification. It would therefore continue to defend the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and to receive transfers of material, equipment and information to that end, and it would fulfil all its NPT obligations. Cuba's Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, and its Additional Protocol, had entered into force in June 2004.

29. His Government rejected the selective implementation of the NPT, whereby disarmament and peaceful uses were neglected in favour of horizontal non-proliferation, and called for Conference discussions and documents to reflect a balance between the three pillars, with particular emphasis on reviewing the implementation of article VI. The Conference was a unique opportunity for nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm their unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and for all States parties to set new goals to that end. Priority must also be given to negotiating a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument in which nuclear-weapon States undertook not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, an issue which the Conference must address.

30. His Government was concerned about the deterioration in recent years of the multilateral disarmament machinery owing to the unilateral and obstructionist attitude of the main nuclear Power, which infringed international law and disregarded multilateral disarmament and arms control treaties. It was worried about a number of new initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which claimed to combat the nuclear terrorism threat but was

actually a non-transparent and selective mechanism that violated the fundamental principles of international law, the Charter and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Such initiatives were detrimental to multilateralism and international cooperation, and aimed to dismantle existing international disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation treaties and bodies. While his Government shared the general concerns about weapons of mass destruction falling into terrorist hands, a selective and discriminatory approach that focused on horizontal proliferation while ignoring vertical proliferation and disarmament was not the solution; the only guarantee was the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

31. Terrorism must be fought without double standards. A crusade could not be waged against international terrorism while the leader of that crusade harboured terrorists in its own territory; international terrorism could not be eliminated if some types of terrorist act were condemned, while others were silenced, tolerated or justified. Cuba was in favour of an international coalition against terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, but only within the framework of international cooperation, the United Nations and the relevant international treaties. Respect for international law and the Charter was the only guarantee for international peace and security. The world must be governed by a collective security system offering full guarantees for all, not by the law of the jungle or doctrines and initiatives that violated the Charter.

32. **Mr. Chem** (Cambodia) said that Cambodia's Constitution prohibited the manufacture, use and storage of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Cambodia had actively participated in the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2004 and reiterated its full support for efforts to boost implementation of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), urging the nuclear-weapon States to sign its Protocol at the earliest opportunity. Like many States parties, Cambodia believed that IAEA played a fundamental role in applying, and verifying compliance with, the international safeguards obligation laid down in article III and in strengthening the regime. Moreover, the Model Additional Protocol was the ideal instrument for making the IAEA system more efficient and effective. In the light of past experience, the international community should make every effort to rid the world of the threat of nuclear weapons. In that regard, Cambodia reiterated its full support for the total elimination of such weapons for the sake of future generations.

33. **Mr. Capelle** (Marshall Islands) said that, situated in a part of the world where three global Powers had tested nuclear weapons, the Marshall Islands had a unique and credible voice on the importance and urgency of non-proliferation. His delegation shared the view expressed by the Director-General of IAEA that the core of the NPT could be summed up in two words: security and development. Security for all by reducing — and ultimately eliminating — the nuclear threat, and development for all through advanced technology. His delegation acknowledged the development priorities and security concerns of States parties, but wished to emphasize human rights issues. For most people, security meant healthy land and resources and a healthy body, not the presence of weapons. Global leaders did not have the right to take away the security of others in order to feel more secure themselves. The Marshall Islands had experienced nuclear war 67 times, with more radiation being released there than anywhere else on the planet. Needless to say, it was still suffering from the adverse consequences of nuclear testing. Non-proliferation was one of his country's fundamental goals, as non-proliferation of weapons also meant non-proliferation of illness, forced relocation, environmental degradation and profound disturbances in social, cultural, economic and political systems. The Marshall Islands knew that from first-hand experience. The nuclear era had affected his country so profoundly that its inhabitants had even had to develop new words to describe the gross abnormalities that exposure to radiation had caused to the environment, animals and human beings. The Marshall Islands would not wish that fate on anyone and had therefore devoted itself to nuclear non-proliferation.

34. His delegation called on the United Nations to address the damage caused in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by detonation of nuclear weapons by the Administering Authority. The trust territory relationship had been terminated following reports by that Authority that the damage and injuries caused by the testing programme were minor and limited. In the light of declassified documents revealing that not to be the case, he urged the current Conference to recommend that the former Authority fully address all

the said damages and injuries. His delegation would push for such language to be included in the Conference's final report. The Pacific Island Forum leaders in 2004 had called for the United States fully to meet its obligations to provide fair and adequate compensation and ensure the safe resettlement of displaced populations. They had also urged States that had tested nuclear weapons in French Polynesia and Kiribati to take full responsibility for the impact of their activities on the local people and environment.

35. While still suffering from the lingering consequences of radiation exposure, the Marshall Islands welcomed the fact that, as a result of long-term cooperation, fewer nuclear weapons existed and fewer States possessed them than in the past and that the NPT had been improved, updated and extended. His country had recently signed an IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. It also recognized the importance of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

36. The Heads of State of the Pacific island countries maintained a strong communal interest in the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and in protecting the Pacific region from environmental pollution. The Marshall Islands applauded the efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum to work with nuclear shipping States on prevention, response, liability and compensation and continued to seek their assurances that the Pacific region would not have to deal on its own with the aftermath of accident. His delegation hoped that progress would be achieved on the 2005 Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, which emphasized the need to develop and strengthen international regulatory regimes for the transport of radioactive material by sea.

37. While States parties were entitled to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the rights guaranteed by article IV of the Treaty must not be misused to justify the development of uranium enrichment and processing capabilities. It joined others in favouring restraints on the use of modern technology for purposes that might be in contravention of non-proliferation commitments under the Treaty.

38. In conclusion, he stressed the role of education in improving citizens' understanding of nuclear weapons and their effects and said that, as former President of the College of the Marshall Islands, he had established a programme to serve that purpose. He looked forward to working with other interested parties on education-related issues.

39. **Mr. Rivasseau** (France) said that the questions of the universality of the NPT, its effective implementation and the repercussions of withdrawal should be highlighted at the Conference. He called for a productive approach towards non-proliferation and the prevention of terrorist risks through, inter alia, strengthened national and international instruments. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the adoption of the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Group of Eight Action Plan adopted at Sea Island, Georgia; Security Council resolution 1540 (2004); the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; and the Proliferation Security Initiative. He urged those States parties which had not already done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

40. Together with Germany and the United Kingdom, and with the support of the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, France was addressing the problem of the clandestine nuclear programme in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was also supporting diplomatic efforts by other States to resolve the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and had put forward ideas and proposals within the framework of the Conference, the European Union, the Group of Eight and IAEA.

41. While many States parties feared that strengthening the non-proliferation regime would infringe on the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the real danger lay in uncontrolled proliferation by a handful of States, often with the support of clandestine networks. States parties, including developing countries, that failed to meet their non-proliferation obligations, to implement IAEA safeguards or to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes should not be entitled to the benefit provided under article IV of the Treaty. France was in favour of a number of measures designed to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, including recognition of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as a verification standard (France and the other European Union countries had concluded additional protocols on 30 April 2004) and a

strengthened multilateral system with a stronger role for the Security Council. In that connection, it supported closer cooperation between the Council and IAEA, which might take the form of regular reports to the Security Council by the Director-General of IAEA, as proposed by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

42. States must also assume greater responsibility for the transfer of nuclear items. Where non-proliferation obligations were not honoured, nuclear cooperation should be denied pending the application of appropriate remedial measures under IAEA supervision. While recognizing the need to tighten controls over the export of sensitive technology, his delegation did not advocate a total ban on the export of fuel cycle technologies but rather the adoption of criteria for common controls. The Conference should also recognize the useful role played by supplier groups. His delegation supported the expansion of those groups and urged them to share their experience in export controls with non-members and with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The rules governing the transfer of less sensitive equipment and facilities, particularly to developing countries with considerable energy needs, should not be unnecessarily restrictive or hamper economic growth and sustainable development. Countries conducting electronuclear programmes for peaceful purposes should be guaranteed access to the fuel cycle or fuel itself at market prices.

43. The Conference should consider the consequences of withdrawal from the Treaty and hold State parties accountable for any violations committed prior to their withdrawal. The Security Council should be notified of a State party's intention to withdraw and examine each case, and intergovernmental agreements on the transfer of nuclear items should prohibit the use of previously transferred nuclear materials, facilities, equipment or technologies in the event of withdrawal from the NPT. States withdrawing from the Treaty must be required to freeze, under IAEA control, and then dismantle and return, nuclear items purchased from a third country for peaceful uses prior to withdrawal.

44. Reiterating the importance attached to universality by the European Union in its common position of 11 November 2003 and its Common Strategy of 12 December 2003, he called on India, Israel and Pakistan to make every effort to comply with international standards on non-proliferation and export control.

45. While the 2005 Review Conference should accord priority to proliferation crises threatening international peace and security, disarmament obligations must not be overlooked. Since its accession to the Treaty, France had taken a number of steps in the field of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. He stressed his country's commitment to the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and to the programme of action for implementing it outlined in decision 2 on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It was unfortunate, however, that at a time when nuclear-weapon States were undertaking strong commitments, a number of States parties were accelerating the development of their illegal nuclear programme.

46. France had signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 1998. It had dismantled its nuclear testing centre in the Pacific and, as early as 1996, had halted the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, shut down its fissile-material production plants in Pierrelatte and Marcoule and begun the lengthy process of dismantling them. It had drastically cut its nuclear arsenal, eliminating all its surface-to-surface nuclear weapons, reducing the number of its ballistic-missile nuclear submarines and decreasing its total number of delivery vehicles by two thirds since 1985. In conclusion, he called for the universalization and entry into force of the CTBT, and for the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

47. **Mr. Koonjul** (Mauritius) expressed concern at the selective implementation of NPT provisions. Non-proliferation was apparently being given higher priority than the other two pillars, particularly disarming. Plans by nuclear-weapon States to develop new types of nuclear weapon systems or improve nuclear weapon technology caused uneasiness among non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, he highlighted the importance of legally binding instruments that provided effective guarantees against the use or threat of force, particularly the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the July 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament had also sown scepticism among the non-nuclear-weapon States. A fissile material cut-off treaty that banned production for nuclear weapons and other

nuclear explosive devices would be a catalyst to nuclear disarmament and, at the same time, provide security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty should begin as soon as possible under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament.

48. His delegation welcomed the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as a deterrent to illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and material and called for enhanced cooperation to strengthen regional and national capacities aimed at preventing deadly nuclear materials and weapons from falling into the wrong hands.

49. Nuclear science played a key role in economic and social development — including in the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry — and the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must be guaranteed. A climate of cooperation in the international community at large would encourage States to provide objective guarantees that their nuclear programmes were being used for exclusively peaceful purposes, and to take other confidence-building measures. IAEA must also be given the necessary resources and technical expertise to verify compliance with Treaty obligations, enhance its safeguard system and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology through its technical cooperation programmes.

50. His delegation strongly advocated the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and had participated in the recent Conference of States Parties of Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Mexico City. Mauritius had been one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba, aimed at establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, for which nine additional ratifications were still required. He hailed the adoption by the five Central Asian States parties of a negotiated text on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and expressed the hope that a similar instrument would soon be agreed to for the Middle East.

51. The transport of radioactive materials and waste by sea posed a particularly grave threat to small island developing States. Accidents could cause irreparable damage to the ecological system and affect the economic survival of small island States dependent on fisheries and marine-related activities. The Mauritius Strategy for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States adopted at the International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, held in Mauritius January 2005, highlighted the need for regulatory regimes to monitor the transport of hazardous waste.

Election of Vice-Presidents (*continued*)

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

52. **The President** said that the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States had nominated candidates from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines and Senegal to serve as Vice-Presidents.

53. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to approve those candidatures.

54. *It was so decided.*

55. **The President** said that, at its 1st meeting, the Conference had appointed five out of six members of the Credentials Committee. On the recommendation of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, he wished to propose that Guyana should become the sixth member of the Credentials Committee.

56. *It was so decided.*

57. **The President** informed the Conference that three posts of Vice-President, the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee and posts of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I and Main Committee II and the Drafting Committee were still vacant. He appealed to States parties to submit candidates for the remaining posts as soon as possible.

58. *The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.*

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

6 June 2005

Original: English

Summary record of the 9th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 6 May 2005, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. de Queiroz Duarte ..... (Brazil)

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General debate (*continued*)

Adoption of the agenda

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05-33589 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Badji** (Senegal) said that, although many had hoped for a world free of the nuclear menace when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had entered into force in 1970, the world had not ceased to be haunted by the threat of nuclear catastrophe. However, the Treaty could still rid the world of nuclear weapons, provided that the States parties — both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States — rapidly fulfilled their respective commitments on the basis of the Treaty's three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

2. Whereas vertical non-proliferation continued to be a subject of great concern, considerable progress had been made in the area of horizontal non-proliferation, as reflected notably in the continued development of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that regard, the Government of Mexico should be congratulated for organizing the April 2005 Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Those African States that had not yet ratified the African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) should do so as soon as possible in order to ensure its rapid entry into force. Moreover, Israel should ratify the NPT and submit its facilities to the comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

3. Recalling his country's accession to the 1991 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, he urged all States — particularly those that conducted nuclear programmes — to comply strictly with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 58/40 on the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes (A/RES/58/40).

4. Considerable work remained to be done in the areas of vertical non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the NPT. All States parties to the Conference on Disarmament, especially nuclear-weapon States, should demonstrate the flexibility and commitment required to ensure that the Conference functioned effectively. His delegation continued to support the programme of work proposed by the group of five ambassadors, which offered a credible basis for negotiations.

5. Senegal fully endorsed the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, which stated that the only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons remained their complete elimination. Implementation of the 13 steps on nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2000 Review Conference would help achieve that objective, and notable in that regard was the agreement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It was also imperative that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) should enter into force as soon as possible. Lastly, his delegation wished to reaffirm the right of States to exploit nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the NPT.

6. **Mr. Baatar** (Mongolia) said that the NPT was the most important legally binding instrument available to the international community to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. Attaining absolute universality of the Treaty was crucial to the global non-proliferation regime. The accession of Cuba and Timor-Leste to the Treaty was to be welcomed, and India, Israel and Pakistan should join the Treaty as non-nuclear States as soon as possible.

7. It was regrettable that the 13 steps on nuclear disarmament set forth in article VI of the NPT had not yet been fully implemented, and the 2005 Review Conference provided a welcome opportunity to make further progress in that regard. His delegation wished to reiterate its strong support for the CTBT, as well as the importance of its early entry into force and universality, and called on all States that had not yet signed and/or ratified that Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

8. Negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices were long overdue, and the scope of such a treaty should include pre-existing stocks. It was regrettable that the related resolution (resolution 59/81), which was traditionally adopted by consensus, had required a vote for its adoption at the General Assembly's fifty-ninth session. Mongolia welcomed the commitment made by the United States of America and the Russian Federation under the 2002 Strategic

Offensive Reductions Treaty ("Moscow Treaty"), and joined the Secretary-General in urging the two parties concerned to pursue arms control agreement that entailed not just dismantlement but also irreversibility.

9. Mongolia fully agreed with previous speakers that the global non-proliferation regime faced many challenges. Ownership and control of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems was no longer confined to States, and in that regard, his delegation had been dismayed at the revelations concerning the clandestine procurement network of Abdul Qadeer Khan. A number of international initiatives had been taken with a view to reversing that dangerous trend, notably Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Mongolia also welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

10. The credibility of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament measures depended to a large extent on the effectiveness of their verification regimes. In that regard, Mongolia wished to reaffirm its commitment to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system and its additional protocols. It also wished to underscore the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

11. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were a crucial element of the global non-proliferation regime. Mongolia had been consistent in its support of the existing zones and commended the Government of Mexico for organizing the April 2005 Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, at which representatives had expressed their recognition and full support of Mongolia's international nuclear-weapon-free status. The outcome of the Conference had also been welcomed by the Non-Aligned Movement. Lastly, Mongolia was a vocal advocate of a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula, and therefore strongly supported the multilateral process aimed at resolving the issue peacefully.

Adoption of the agenda

The meeting was suspended at 10.40 a.m. and resumed at 11.50 a.m.

12. **The President** drew attention to the provisional agenda and the related statement of the President (NPT/CONF.2005/CRP.1 and CRP.2, respectively), which had been endorsed by the members of the General Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the meeting wished to adopt the two documents.

13. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt) said that, to reach consensus, all points of view must be taken into consideration. The shift in approach reflected in the provisional agenda and the accompanying President's statement would be acceptable to Egypt with two minor amendments. First, to reflect previously used wording, the phrase "in the light of" in the first line of the President's statement should be replaced with the words "taking into account". Secondly, in the second line of the statement the words "and the outcomes" should be inserted after the word "resolution".

14. **The President** said he regretted that his proposal could not be adopted by consensus. However, he was confident that the Conference would continue to rely on his services as President to achieve consensus on the agenda. It was vital to begin working on substantive issues as soon as possible, and he therefore called on all interested delegations to continue consultations with a view to finding a solution to the current impasse as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at noon.